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 Abstract 
Lynching in Bolivia has been portrayed as a largely routinized and primarily 
urban occurrence that is a direct response to the state's inability to provide 
security. Using a recent case of rural lynching as a starting point, I will 
evaluate the idea of rural Bolivian lynching in Indigenous communities as 
vigilantism. I contrast what little is known about rural lynching in Bolivia to 
the known pattern of urban lynching and ask if these are distinct phenomena. 
Finally, I discuss the idea of ancestral validation and the punishment rights 
implied by a western-style state sanctioning aspects of non-western justice. I 
ask, do our existing models for such extreme cases as fatal vigilantism exclude 
lynching in rural Indigenous Bolivian communities? At the heart of this 
discussion is how we define a cultural practice vs. how we define deviance in 
a multicultural society; how we nest authority structures and how we afford 
them legitimate rights to the use of force and other extreme control measures. 
  
Community Justice in Bolivia 
Since the mid-1990s, anthropologists and sociologists have recorded an 
increase in incidents of justicia comunitaria (community justice) among the 
residents of Bolivia’s marginalised Indigenous communities (e.g Goldstein 
2003, 2004, 2012; Goldeetein & Castro 2006). A general definition of justicia 
comunitaria has its foundation in the idea that community tribunals, acting in 
accordance with socially relevant definitions of societal norms, have the right 
to self-police and to mete out justice. It is cast as authentic, ancient, and 
inherently valid.  
 
In the eyes of the state, this form of justice is considered to be for minor social 
infractions and low-level social disputes, a 'jurisdictional demarcation' that 
applies only to 'internal controversies within [Indigenous] communities 
(Martinez, 2010, quoting Bolivian congressperson Norma Pierola). It is 
inevitably cast as Indigenous, rural, and non-western: unrelated to normal 
state justice. This conception of justicia comunitaria was included in Bolivia's 
2009 constitution and is meant to be a step towards racial and cultural 
inclusion (Goldstein, 2012: 169). The state-level acceptance of this form of 
justicia comunitaria is tied to Bolivia's long and complicated history of cultural 
inequality maintenance and further development of structures of indigenous 
governance from the time of the Conquest.  
 
Unlike in other parts of South America where mestizoization and forced 
hispanization were long-standing Spanish strategies for control, in Bolivia 
Indigenous communities were 'reduced' to planned villages but within those 
villages they were by and large allowed to retain their language, cultural 
traditions, leadership, and justice systems (Klein 2003: 34). The darker side of 
this arrangement included mandatory supplying of labor for Bolivia's harsh 
silver mines, significant taxation, undermining of land rights, and moving 
into the 20th century, a clear separation of indigenous Bolivians from all 
structures of the Bolivian state, despite the fact that Indigenous Bolivians did 
and perhaps still do form Bolivia's ethnic majority. 
 
Through the 19th and 20th centuries, incorporation of indigenous people into 
Bolivia's public life became a point of concern and controversy within both 
white and indigenous communities. Indigenous people were blamed for the 
country's failures, and cast as the cause of 'backwardness' and poor 
development (Hylton & Sinclair 2007: 47–48), even through the nationalist 
political movements of the 1950s. This led to policies of forced cultural 
assimilation but no true integration (Rivera Cusicanqui 1987: 117). Indigenous 
Bolivians through schooling (unavailable to most Indigenous Bolivians until 
after the 1950s), forced land titling, use of Spanish language, and name 
changes were meant to act more white but were not meant to enter white 
society. 
 
It was not until the social movements of the 1980s and subsequent electoral 
reforms, particularly the 1994 Law of Popular Participation, that Indigenous 
Bolivians had any reasonable chance of holding public office, and educational 
barriers have ensured that Indigenous Bolivians remain critically 
underrepresented within the justice system. It remains difficult to this day for 
indigenous Bolivians to open bank accounts, secure loans, access higher 
education, and navigate the justice system. And this is despite the presidency 
of Evo Morales (2006–time of writing), himself an indigenous coca grower 
and union leader who was forced to leave school at age 14. 
 
Thus the continued presence of the idea of justicia comunitaria as a way to 
settle minor internal disputes within Bolivian in indigenous communities is a 
practical replacement for a historically separate, unresponsive, and alien 
justice system built around tenants of social exclusion. It is also represents a 
claim of autonomy and order amid generations of state-level assertions of 
indigenous backwardness. In this form, it is accepted by recent government as 
a decolonising policy which fits into a larger narrative of indigenous 
inclusion, autonomous governance, and cultural survival over hispanisation. 
That is until justicia comunitaria is fatal. 
 
In popular Bolivian discussion and very much under aegis of ancestral justice, 
a second definition of justicia comunitaria is based on a specific act: the 
lynching of a criminal, usually an alleged thief. In the Bolivia, this is defined 
by capturing the thief in the act, publicly beating them, binding them, stoning 
them, and immolating them, all as part of a large public crowd, although not 
all of these elements must occur for it to be considered a lynching. These 
lynchings have been documented as occurring in poor Indigenous 
communities, either in urban slum environments or in the rural highlands. 
Fatal punishment is portrayed as quick, brutal and routinised. Although 
lynchings can be called linchamientos or ajusticiamientos, in modern Bolivia 
simply using the term justicia comunitaria implies that a lynching has occurred 
or could occur. 
 
The idea that justicia comunitaria inherently involves lynching is controversial. 
Those who defend the practice say that it forms part of the original justice 
system of pre-Conquest Bolivia and is an important element of ancient social 
control. To deny that the practice is ancient becomes a denial of indigenous 
Bolivians' right to define their own history, culture, and traditions; indeed to 
define their own reality; it is seen as white people trying to destroy or 
downgrade indigenous culture. Whatever evidence may exist for or against 
the practice of Bolivian lynching as being ancient is immaterial: indigenous 
Bolivians perceive it to be ancient and thus it is. This means that any 
government-level attempt at separating the practice of lynching from justicia 
comnitaria must walk a thin line between acceptable social reform and 
outright denial of indigenous cultural legitimacy. 
 
Because of the connection between the term justicia comunitaria and lynching, 
the 2009 Bolivian Constitution favoured the phrase justicia indígena originaria 
campeseña, original Indigenous peasant justice. This was meant to move away 
from the lynching connotations while still appearing inclusive and 
empowering of Indigenous communities. To retain the positive social gains 
from not interfering with low-level dispute resolutions and punishment of 
minor offences within indigenous communities, while not sanctioning capital 
punishment which is not allowed under Bolivian law. However, as will be 
discussed, many communities do not accept that justicia comunitaria excludes 
lynching as a possible punitive outcome. 
Confidence in Authority and Perceptions of Insecurity 
Justicia comunitaria, in both the muted and the violent sense, assumes that the 
regular Bolivian justice system is either unavailable or is not the proper 
authority to appeal to. For the most part, state-level justice in Bolivia can be 
deemed unavailable to nearly everyone. There are only 764 judges and courts 
servicing Bolivia’s population of 10.4 million people. In 2012, nearly half of 
Bolivia's municipalities did not have a judge, 77% did not have a prosecutor, 
and 97% did not have a public defender (Consejo de Derechos Humanos, 
2012: 10; La Razón, 2012; Chávez, 2013). By the end of 2011 there were nearly 
500,000 cases awaiting resolution as well as 653 open cases before Bolivian 
courts and tribunals (Consejo de Derechos Humanos, 2012: 11). 
  
Bolivian confidence in the police is one of the lowest in Latin America.1 Only 
38.9% express confidence in their police force, on par with Mexico (39.9%), a 
country whose police force has one of the worst reputations in the world. 
Lowland Bolivia (which has the largest concentration of white Bolivians) has 
the highest confidence in the police, and highland Bolivia (which is largely 
Indigenous) has the lowest confidence in the police. When asked if the police 
ask for bribes, 20.0% reported that they did, the second highest figure for 
police corruption in the Americas after Mexico (20.5%) (Ciudadanía & 
LAPOP, 2012: 106). Indigenous Bolivians had the least confidence in the 
police (Ciudadanía & LAPOP, 2012: 106). 
  
In 2008, less than 1% of Bolivians identified ‘crime’ as being the primary 
problem of the country. In 2012, that number increased to 12% (Ciudadanía & 
LAPOP, 2012: 135). In 2006, 17% of Bolivians reported being the victim of a 
crime; in 2012 that number grew to 28% (Ciudadanía & LAPOP, 2012: 136). 
Furthermore, 31% said that another person in their household had been the 
victim of a crime in the past year (Ciudadanía & LAPOP, 2012: 139). In 2012 
44.8% of Bolivians reported that they felt insecure: on par with famously-
insecure Haiti at 44.2 % (Ciudadanía & LAPOP, 2012: 138). 
  
When asked if the authorities captured criminals in accordance with the law, 
only 53% of Bolivians thought they did, the lowest confidence level in the 
Americas (Ciudadanía & LAPOP, 2012: 143). When it comes to resorting to 
taking justice into their own hands, this study found that Indigenous 
Bolivians were far more likely than white or mestizo Bolivians to consider this 
an acceptable response to crime (Ciudadanía & LAPOP, 2012: 142). 
 
Specifically in the case of lynchings, Bolivia's Ombudsman and former head 
of the Permanent Assembly on Human Rights of Bolivia, Rolando Villena has 
stated that ‘the phenomenon of lynching has exceeded the ability of the state 
and corresponds, in most cases, to the deep crisis of the judicial system and if 
this is not resolved [the state] cannot answer the public demand for safety, 
security, and full justice’ (Villena quoted in Villa, 2013a). 
 
This leads to the question: if state-level justice performed better, would 
indigenous Bolivians continue to practice fatal lynchings. The general feeling 
both within Bolivia and by commentators on the outside is that it would, but 
significant study of the cultural attachments to the practice have not been 
conducted.  
Marginalisation and Spectacle 
Most literature on the subject of Andean lynching cites the Weberian 
conception of ‘the state’: an entity with a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
physical force to maintain order in a specific territory. The extent of the 
legitimate force is, in essence, the extent of the state and statehood is 
predicated on the maintenance of this monopoly. Thus, if a community turns 
to lynching as the most valid form of justice, control and public order, they 
have usurped the state’s monopoly on legitimate force. The next logical step 
in this construction is to assert that an entity that has lost control of the 
legitimate use of physical force to maintain order is a failed state. 
  
Lynching is not uncommon in Bolivia. The newspaper La Razón has reported 
that between April and August of 2013, 35 people were lynched in Bolivia in 
18 events which resulted in six deaths (Villa, 2013a). According to Juan 
Mollericona of Bolivia's National Observatory on Citizen Security the press 
has reported on over 150 lynching deaths and over 100 near lynchings 
between 2005 and 2012 (Mollericona quoted in Villa, 2013a). Goldstein and 
Castro counted 42 incidents: ‘one every eight or nine days’ in 2006 alone. 
They speculate that this is a low number as many lynchings are poorly 
reported (Goldstein and Castro, 2006: 394).  
 
Researchers have tied these lynchings to state security failure among 
marginalised communities and they are characterised as a ‘moral complaint 
against state inadequacy’ (Goldstein 2003: 22) or communities rejecting ‘their 
marginalization from the benefits promised by the modern democratic state, 
including security for persons and property’ (Goldstein 2003: 24). In other 
words, lynching in Bolivia is a demand for inclusion (Goldstein 2003: 25).  
 
Some researchers have focused on the performative aspect of lynching. 
Goldstein (2004) portrays lynching as a violent performance that publicises a 
community’s perceived marginalisation. He compares the performance of 
lynching to community festivals: a display of identity, community affiliation 
and self-sufficiency. He describes ‘community’ as a political tool, an ideology 
used to foster change in the context of marginality and neglect from 
authorities (Goldstein 2004: 94), and claims that both lynching and public 
festivals are evidence of this tool being exercised. In later analysis, Goldstein 
and Castro (2006) argue that an increase in lynchings corresponds to media 
interest in the act. While the media tends to ignore the normal security issues 
in marginal communities, they aggressively cover lynchings (Goldstein and 
Castro 2006: 381), and ‘[l]ynch-mob participants… creatively exploit this 
coverage to advance their own agendas, using violence to publicise local 
conditions and to dramatize their own positions of vulnerability for the public 
imagination’ (Goldstein and Castro, 2006: 382). 
  
Further building on the idea of lynching as a public spectacle through which 
marginal communities make themselves visible to a state (and public), Risør 
(2010) documented the appearance of signs warning criminals of the 
possibility of lynching and of community-constructed effigies of lynching 
victims in the city of El Alto. She sees this as a move away from the idea of 
lynching as a violent act perpetrated by individuals, towards looking at the 
practice as collective self-defence (Risør, 2010: 466). The public display of 
anonymously produced signs and effigies, which Risør (2010: 468) sees as 
providing a ‘spectral presence in the Derrida sense’, projects the constant 
possibility and collective approval of lynching. This is reinforced by a 
community code of silence when the police attempt to investigate these 
occurrences. 
The Community: Who are the Vecinos? 
Lynch mobs are often referred to as vecinos, which translates to ‘neighbours’: a 
faceless entity (Risør, 2010: 467). Despite this outward affirmation of 
facelessness, the reality is that vecinos are usually poor members of marginal 
Indigenous communities who are, essentially, faceless to the state. 
Responding to people who denounce lynching as savage, one of Goldstein’s 
(2004: 186) informants explained that outsiders did not know what it was like 
to be as poor as them; did not know what it was like to not be able to pay for a 
doctor if they are sick. Community members tend to have very little and 
when what little they have is stolen they cannot easily recover from the theft. 
  
Vecinos have almost no direct access to state institutions. For the most part, 
their access to the state is mediated through local committees, trade unions or 
other social organisations with varying degrees of responsiveness (Risør, 
2010: 469). Opportunity for direct participation is minimal and, in particular, 
state responsiveness to perceived security threats felt by vecinos is minimal. 
Indeed, ‘the poor [vecinos] themselves are often criminalised in public 
discourse and in police practice, and experience heightened police violence, as 
states adopt more repressive and violent measures in the name of crime 
control’ (Goldstein 2005: 397). Violence is part of the everyday life of 
marginalised Indigenous people, particularly in Bolivia’s urban slums, which 
creates a ‘profound sense of insecurity’ (Goldstein 2005: 390). 
The threat: who are the malhechores? 
Malhechores, evildoers or criminals, are seen as subhuman, ‘monstrous, 
fundamentally different than normal people’ and there is a prevailing idea 
that they can be identified by their looks alone (Goldstein, 2012: 126). They are 
imagined as always observing, casing and looking for vulnerability and 
weakness (Goldstein, 2012: 127). In other words, they are a felt to be constant 
threat to property and public order that exists within community and 
individual consciousness and are a source of significant feelings of insecurity. 
Community outsiders, then, are scrutinised as possible malhechores and are 
approached as suspicious and community vigilance against and fear of 
possible malhechores is an important pre-requisite for lynchings. 
  
One of the strongest narratives to come out of research into lynching in 
Bolivia is the idea of the criminal as an outsider. Peruvians, for example, are 
‘widely regarded in Bolivia as inherently criminal’ and are thus blamed for 
much crime (Goldstein, 2012: 132). Thieves are conceived of as people who 
have no commitment to the community and as deserving of any punishment 
that the community decides upon (Goldstein 2003: 31). Despite this idea of the 
criminal as outsider, when it comes to social strata ‘[i]n most cases, both the 
victims and the perpetrators of lynching violence are of indigenous origin 
(Quechua and/or Aymara), and belong to the poorest, most marginal sectors 
of Bolivian society’ (Goldstein 2005: 393). 
The Lynching 
Researchers (e.g. Goldstein 2005: 393; Goldstein and Castro, 2006: 395) have 
portrayed Bolivian lynchings as highly routinised; they almost appear to have 
a set, ritualised script. This idea of ritualised lynching is supported by Risør 
who describes them as ‘planned events’ where the possibility of a lynching 
has either been verbally decided upon in a community beforehand or exists in 
the minds of vecinos as a distinct possibility (Risør, 2010: 481). This is not to 
say that there is no debate during the lynching: Goldstein (2012: 148–149) has 
characterised the practice as occurring within an ‘atmosphere of uncertainty’ 
with ‘deeply conflicted’ participants.  
  
Bolivian lynchings seem quick and severe when set against the slow pace of 
the formal justice system, but the formulaic process can take hours and can 
attract the participation of hundreds of people (Goldstein and Castro, 2006: 
395). They begin when a community member catches an alleged malhechore, 
usually a petty thief, in the act and other community members are called in 
(Goldstein and Castro, 2006: 395). The malhechore becomes a linchado and is 
stripped of their clothing, beaten and whipped, often while tied to some sort 
of pole, much like the lynching effigies seen in various Bolivian 
neighbourhoods (Risør, 2010: 481). 
  
At the same time the accused 'are interrogated regarding their "true identity": 
Who are they? Why do they steal? Where are they from?’ (Risør, 2010: 481). 
The answers to these questions rarely pacify the crowd and most linchados 
that survive the lynching process do so because of direct intervention from 
the police (Risør, 2010: 481). If there is no intervention, the linchado is usually 
doused with flammable liquid and burned. 
The Police 
Communities that have committed lynchings commonly view the police as 
‘incapable of providing justice because they, too, are unjust’ (Goldstein 2003: 
31). Official interference during a lynching is seen as the police rescuing 
thieves from justice or criminal-cops getting their accomplices out of a jam 
(Goldstein 2003: 31). Goldstein (2003: 28) recounts a situation where vecinos 
threw rocks at police who were trying to intervene in a Cochabamba 
lynching. In 2012, on two unrelated occasions, police officers were themselves 
lynched in the city of El Alto while dressed in civilian clothes (one of the 
officers, a male, allegedly dressed as a woman) after they was mistaken for 
thieves and were unable to prove they were police officers (LAHT, 2012). In 
2010, four police officers were lynched in the village of Uncia after being 
accused of blackmail and more extreme abuses. The community involved 
stated, directly, that they were employing justicia comunitaria against the 
officers (Martinez, 2010). 
  
The reality of the situation is that ‘reliable police protection or recourse to the 
law are simply non-existent’ in the communities where lynching occurs 
(Goldstein 2005: 397). Informants have told researchers that police will not 
investigate crimes unless a bribe is offered and that crime victims are 
expected to pay the cost of investigations (Goldstein 2005: 400). Beyond the 
clear violation of public trust that such corruption presents, crime victims 
from poor communities are not likely to have the money to pay police bribes, 
rendering any sort of access to the police impossible. Goldstein (2005: 401) 
calls this ‘double victimisation’: the crime victim suffers first from the crime 
itself and second from either a forced bribe to law enforcement or being 
totally shut out of the justice system. 
Lynching Perceived 
The public perception of lynching is intimately tied to Bolivia's history of 
turbulent race relations and to race-based class divisions. Goldstein (2004: 13) 
described the situation thus: ‘The division of national space [in Bolivia] 
between the rural and the urban, light and shadow, modernity and 
primitiveness, is accompanied by a corresponding racial distribution that 
located people of purportedly European descent… in cities, with people of 
indigenous origins… located in the countryside’. Lynching exists, then, in the 
rural shadows of the Indigenous countryside. The middle-class press casts it 
as primitive and barbaric (Goldstein 2005: 394), implying that those who 
engage in lynching are, themselves, backwards and brutal holdovers from a 
time before law and order. As previously discussed, Indigenous Bolivians 
have been cast in this role, as being against modernity and outside of normal 
systems. 
 
This however is perceptions, not reality, part of the mythologizing of place 
and space within Bolivia's physical and cultural landscape. While it is true 
that rural highland Bolivia is almost exclusively Indigenous, Bolivia's cities, 
especially in the highlands, have large indigenous populations or indigenous 
majorities due to decades of economic migration. Indigenous culture is very 
much a part of the Bolivian urban experience where language, dress, and 
social customs are maintained and built upon. That said, the social scars of 
hundreds of years of enforced physical separation which cast progress and 
modernity as white and urban and backwardness and primitiveness as 
indigenous and rural are not easily erased.  
Rural Lynching Case Study: Quila Quila (2012)2 
Quila Quila is a very small village of fewer than 200 people located 40 km 
from the city of Sucre. It does not have a police presence and, at an altitude of 
about 3000m and located in rough terrain, it is difficult to reach. The villagers 
are poor Indigenous subsistence farmers who have had their hopes of tourism 
development raised and dashed (IAD n.d., Yates, 2014).3 Recent editions of 
the popular Lonely Planet guidebook to Bolivia characterise Quila Quila as 
potentially dangerous to outsiders. Quila Quila is almost an archetype of 
failed rural Bolivian security. 
 
On 6 March 2012, three male strangers were noticed in the village and, 
according to some reports, these strangers attended Sunday mass in Quila 
Quila's historic Conquest-era church. Villagers, concerned about the 
motivations of these outsiders, placed the church under surveillance. 
 
That night, two of the strangers were allegedly caught exiting the church via a 
window. They were said to be in possession of valuable religious paintings 
and silver items stolen from inside. One of the men was said to have a gun in 
his pocket. The alleged thieves were taken into village custody on Monday 
morning. The lynching process began. 
 
Somehow, on that day, authorities in Sucre were warned about the 
impending lynching, perhaps through the intervention of a priest. Police 
attempted to reach the village on Monday but a flooded river blocked access. 
Attempts to contact the community did not produce assurances of the alleged 
thieves' safety. 
 
The police responders, who may have numbered up to 80 officers and 
officials at that point, attempted to access Quila Quila again on Tuesday 
starting at 4 am. They were able to reach the entrance to the village at 10:30 
am but were met with a blockade of villagers. After several hours of 
negotiation, the police were allowed to enter the village only after they 
promised that no community members would be prosecuted via the state 
justice system and that the unaccounted for third stranger would be found. 
The villagers informed the authorities that the two alleged thieves had been 
judged by the community and killed. 
 
The bodies of Severo Higueres Cruz of Potosí and Pablo Vilasaca Pallehuanca 
of La Paz were found buried behind the church that they were accused of 
buglarizing. An autopsy showed that they had been handcuffed, beaten, 
stoned and had likely died of manual strangulation. The third alleged thief 
has not been identified and no member of the Quila Quila community has yet 
faced charges related to the lynching. 
Is this Vigilantism?  
Some Definitions of Vigilantism 
Is lynching in Bolivia a form of vigilante justice or does it represent a form of 
security response that, due to its non-western nature, is poorly defined via 
existent criminological terminology?  
 
Defining vigilantism has been notoriously difficult. Shortland (1976) defined 
'spontaneous vigilantism' as 'the act by a group of bystanders of not only 
apprehending a suspected wrongdoer but instantly meting out punishment 
and retribution which fall outside the normal justice process' stipulating that 
'[d]irect action against the wrongdoer is taken by the bystanders without 
consulting the police or other authorities. Such behaviour is not normatively 
accepted or sanctioned by legal institutions' (Shortland 1976: 20).  
 
Weisburd (1988) ultimately defines much vigilante behaviour as citizens 
acting in lieu of regular justice and he supports the idea that it involves 
citizens taking the law into their own hands. He understands vigilantism as a 
form of ‘criminal social control’ and that vigilantes act as control agents for 
the larger communities. Expanding on these shorter definitions, Johnston 
(1996) identified six features of vigilante justice: 1) it involves planning and 
premeditation; 2) participants are private citizens; 3) it is a form of 
autonomous citizenship and is, thus, a social movement; 4) it involves the use 
of force; 5) it occurs when the established order is faced with transgression; 6) 
it aims to control crime by offering guarantees of security.  
 
Kirschner (2011) does not equate vigilantism with 'popular mob justice'. She 
sees these acts as 'forms of control of criminality and violence that are 
collective and to a certain extent planned and institutionalized, and represent 
a response to perceived or real deficits in state security institutions in these 
areas'. They are not “firefly events,” which lack any institutionalisation and 
which arise and disappear suddenly and unexpectedly'. This definition casts 
lynching as a collective, if gruesome, experience that is institutionalised and 
even consistent: an expected justice outcome. She states that 'vigilante groups 
can be conceptualised neither exclusively as mere state organs nor as 
opponents or a substitute for state failure' (Kirschner, 2011: 574) Her emphasis 
is on a dual but not an exclusive interplay between real deficits in state-level 
security institutions and culturally-applicable acts in support of conceptions 
of statehood and rights.  
Vigilantism and Lynching, an Urban/Rural Divide? 
Most researchers who have conducted work on lynching in Bolivia have 
concluded that it is primarily a response to insecurity and state-level failure 
(e.g. Goldstein 2003, 2004, 2005, 2012; Mollericona quoted in Villa 2013a; 
Risør, 2010). They downplay the argument that lynching is an ancient and 
cultural practice and tie it more to various periods of state insecurity and the 
growth of Bolivian urban slums. They appear to see lynching as vigilantism 
and expect that a more secure Bolivia, with better justice institutions and 
effective policing, would result in a decrease or even an elimination of 
lynching. Yet with almost no exception, all research on Bolivian lynching has 
been focused on marginalised but urban communities, rather than rural 
communities. While rural communities have undoubtedly been influenced by 
the rise of urban slums, they experience local and state insecurity in different 
ways than city dwellers due in part to low population densities, dependence 
on subsistence-level agrarian activities, and physical distance from state-level 
authorities. Despite the popular conception that lynching is inherently 'rural' 
(Goldstein 2003: 29), rural Bolivian lynching is treated as nearly non-existent 
in the literature. 
 
Lynching is, most certainly, an aspect of justice in many rural Bolivian 
communities. Furthermore, as with the case of Quila Quila and other recent 
cases of rural lynching, elements are observable that do not fit what has come 
to be defined as the normal pattern of lynching in Bolivia where a thief is 
caught in the act, beaten, forced to confess and immolated. Burial (and live 
burial), rather than immolation and public display, is present as a form of 
punishment, often in locations significant to the crime being committed (Aria 
Gutiérrez, 2012, El Diario, 2012a and El Diario, 2012b for Quila Quila; 
Associated Press, 2012 for a live burial committed by 200 community 
members during an alleged murder victim's funeral near Colquechaca; La 
Razon 2010 for the live burial of three brothers in Watallani by the extended 
family of an alleged murder victim in front of a crowd of community 
members). Poison and other forms of fatal punishment are also used (Villa 
2013b for a poisoning followed by hanging in Sorata). Rural lynchings can be 
protracted events with formal hearings and alleged criminals can be killed 
long after crimes have been committed (Associated Press, 2012 for 
Colquechaca; Villa, 2013a for the trial and lynching of a 'witch'4 after one of 
her potions allegedly caused a death). In other words, at least on the surface, 
rural and urban lynching look quite different from each other. 
 
Rural Bolivian lynchings seem, in some cases, to be community events. Local 
and regional authorities (in the form of community and village leaders) may 
be consulted during the lynching process and may even participate. The 
author witnessed just such an event in 2004 while conducting fieldwork in a 
highland Bolivian village. A teenager from outside the village was 
apprehended, while allegedly buglarising a home, and was beaten then 
locked in a closet while the community decided what to do with him. The 
church bells were rung, the community gathered and lynching was weighed 
as an option. There had been several other lynchings in nearby towns that 
month but ultimately the national police were contacted. This 'near lynching', 
a term employed by Goldstein (2006: 393) to describe incidents in Bolivia 
where a lynching is considered or begun but not carried out to death, was far 
from spontaneous; rather, lynching was offered as one of a range of options 
that the community could have chosen based on the circumstances. 
 
While it is clear that lynching in rural Bolivia is meant to be a form of social 
control (as are the actions of any policing force), the idea of vecinos being 
individual control agents does not conform to the aftermath of most Bolivian 
lynchings. Researchers and reporters note a code of silence exists following a 
lynching (e.g. Chávez, 2013 for Entre Ríos; Donoso, 2012 for Quila Quila; 
Melgerejo, 2013 for Volcán) More importantly, there is a firm assertion that no 
individual control agent acts on behalf of the community, rather that the entire 
community acts together to mete out what they believe is a culturally 
sanctioned response to a crime. In this sense, at least in their own conception 
of the lynching, vecinos have not necessarily taken the law into their own 
hands, rather they believe that it is their right to establish and enforce their 
law. Related to the code of silence are several incidents where rural 
communities have extracted signed guarantees that no state-level charges will 
be pressed against individuals that participated in a lynching before bodies 
are handed over to authorities. Such a guarantee was obtained from the 
family members of four police officers lynched in the village of Uncia in 2010 
(Martinez, 2010), for the return of four near-lynching victims to police in 
Belén in 2013 (Mejia, 2013) and from the officials who controversially 
promised immunity to Quila Quila residents in 2012 (Donoso, 2012).  
 
Is it possible that the more 'vigilante' urban Bolivian practice of lynching is 
only tangentially related to the rural practice that is more along the lines of 
capital punishment? At this point, rural Bolivian lynching is so very poorly 
understood that it is impossible to fully make that distinction. Yet elements of 
what is known about cases of rural lynching deviate from key definitions of 
vigilantism towards what can, in some ways, be seen as a legitimate (and 
legitimised) authority issuing lethal punishment in accordance with societal 
norms. 
 
This brings us back to the idea of justicia indígena originaria campeseña: the 
now-constitutional right for an autonomous Indigenous community to police 
itself, to an extent, according to its own traditions and needs. 
Rural Lynching as 'Ancestral' 
Lynching, especially in the rural highlands, seems to exist as a spectre of 
justicia indígena originaria campeseña. Speaking in 2006, then Minister of Justice 
Casimira Rodríguez Romero stated that non-lethal community justice is 
'ancestral justice'; that it 'is a tradition that comes from the ancestors' 
(Carpineta, 2006; Goldstein, 2012: 180). This practice, according to Cintia 
Irrazábal, secretary of the justicia comunitaria program at the Universidad 
Mayor de San Andrés, follows longstanding traditions for the punishment of 
'minor crimes' (Irrazábal quoted in Chávez, 2013). She states that community 
leaders hear accusations of such crimes as theft of livestock or seeds and 
apply reparative sentences that usually involve manual labour. In the case of 
aggravated theft, she asserts, a perpetrator may be banished from the 
community but that this is the maximum penalty: the death penalty is 
banned. 
 
It is the official position of the state justice system that ‘[l]ynching is murder, 
and it cannot be permitted under the concept of justicia comunitaria, because it 
has nothing to do with it; it is a summary execution that violates 
constitutional principles and due process’ (Freddy Rorrico, departmental 
prosecutor for Cocabamba, quoted in Chávez, 2013). 
 
Indeed, there have been some recent cases of the Bolivian government 
pressing charges against individual actors in rural lynchings, however even in 
these cases, one or two people tend to be charged for a collective act that 
involved up to several hundred people (e.g. Associated Press, 2013 for two 
people charged out of an alleged 200 lynching participants in Colquechaca). 
There has been no case of an entire Bolivian community being charged with 
lynching as a crime. It is unclear if that is even possible. 
 
Anecdotal accounts indicate that some members of rural communities feel it 
is their prerogative to mete out lethal punishment if they feel it conforms to 
their system of ancestral rights and justice. Corporal punishment, usually in 
the form of whipping, is accepted within government sanctioned justicia 
indígena originaria campeseña (for example see Carpineta, 2006). As the central 
government transfers this level of control over to communities (or, 
alternatively, acknowledges that those communities have always had a right 
to such things), communities may feel it is also their right to decide if an 
accused criminal lives or dies. Thus a lynching, as seen in 2012 at Quila Quila, 
appears to exist in ancient time and space, much like the government 
conception of non-lethal community justice. 
 
If in modern Bolivia justicia indígena originaria campeseña is accepted as 
ancestral, culturally appropriate and constitutionally sanctioned, are not the 
punitive results of this justice system sanctioned as well? It can be argued that 
the constitutional establishment of justicia comunitaria as a sanctioned legal 
institution in Bolivia based on ancestral validation pre-approves the 
punishments that communities deem to be 'ancestral'. 
 
For those that accept a theory of retributive justice based on proportionate 
response to crime, capital punishment meted out without a ‘fair trial’ for what 
is considered in Western contexts to be minor crimes seem grossly out of 
proportion. Indeed, to western eyes, this seemingly cold and violent brutality 
confirms the applicability of uncivilizing and demeaning terms, and their 
underlying social oppressions, that have been applied to Indigenous Bolivians 
by whites: barbarism, primitivism, savagery. In this construction, the only 
way to escape such darkness is to give up ancient uncivilised ways, to 
modernize and accept an applied Western justice system, where the still-
present race-based violence is often subtle and systematic. It is from resistance 
to this denial of Indigenous modernity and this forced assimilation into 
Western cultural constructions that we find a persistent defence for justicia 
indígena originaria campeseña generally and, at times an acceptance of fatal 
justicia comunitaria.  
 
Perhaps it is worth considering key passages from the Manifesto of 
Tiwanaku, a foundational document produced in 1973 by an influential 
indigenous ideological movement. The Manifesto powerfully states “We want 
an end to state paternalism […] we are foreigners in our own country” and 
that “there has not been an integration of cultures in Bolivia, but a 
superimposition and domination” The authors also assert that “neither our 
virtues nor our own view of the world and of life have been respected […] 
our culture has not been respected and our mentality has not been 
understood” and that “the systematic attempt to destroy [indigenous] 
cultures is the source of the nation’s frustrations” (translations from Rivera 
Cusicanqui 1987). Many indigenous Bolivians actively reject the belief that 
indigenous culture and lifeways are the source of the country’s failures, 
maintaining that denial of the Indigenous world view in favour of Western 
structures is the problem. Defending that which can be seen as “authentic” 
and “ancestral”, then, is tantamount to asserting social dignity and cultural 
validity. 
Concluding Thoughts 
What emerges from this discussion of lynching, insecurity, vigilantism and 
ancestral justice is a realisation that we know very little about the mechanisms 
and motivations behind lynchings in Bolivia's poor, rural and Indigenous 
communities. This gap in our knowledge is associated with the primary 
reasons that such lynchings are even possible: the remote, exclusive, 
autonomous nature of these communities. Some of the logistical impediments 
to research into rural Bolivian lynching are worth mentioning. 
 
First, crimes that might result in lynching as punishment do not occur on a 
fixed schedule nor are they communicated to the outside as they occur. As a 
result researchers are rarely present for rural lynching events. None of the 
anthropologists cited in this article who write extensively on Bolivian 
lynching have ever seen one occur. The author was present for a near 
lynching by chance while conducting unrelated archaeological excavations 
nearby. 
 
Second, following a Bolivian lynching there is almost always a community 
imposed 'code of silence', even in urban settings. Community and sub-
community, often in the form of ancestral moieties, are the structural 
backbone of rural Indigenous highland life. Lynching, when seen as a 
community event, is protected as such. Deviance from within the community 
is policed from the inside. Communities will refuse to discuss lynching with 
law enforcement and researchers out of legitimate concern for state-level 
punishment or outside interference. 
 
Third, it is likely that rural lynchings are critically under-reported. Even in 
urban settings, it is thought that lynchings and near-lynchings are either not 
reported to the authorities or are recorded inaccurately. In rural, remote, or 
closed communities, there is every opportunity for lynchings to not be 
brought to national-level authorities, especially in light of the 'code of silence' 
mentality. Thus what little that does trickle out about rural lynching comes 
from rare denunciations and, usually, the popular and hyperbolic press. In 
other words, existing information about rural lynching is not reliable. 
 
These obstacles are most likely to be mitigated, not by white western scholars 
like the author, who just happened to be near an aborted rural lynching while 
conducting unrelated fieldwork, but researchers coming from within Bolivia’s 
rural Indigenous communities. They are likely better placed to overcome 
resistance to discussing these actions and the underlying cultural experiences 
that they represent. If perceived “ancient” authenticity is an integral part of 
justicia communitaria, scholars working from an entirely Western tradition 
may be unable to see beyond the structures and frameworks of Western-style 
justice, which is itself perhaps a fair critique of much criminological research. 
For those working in the global south, the call for increased investment in the 
development of locally produced research is a familiar one. 
 
The possibility that lynching in the rural Andes might represent a type of 
punishment that cannot easily be called vigilantism leads to fascinating 
research questions. Is lynching tied in any way to other forms of rural Andean 
ritualised violence? Is the 'Inka motto' ama sua, ama llulla, ama quella (don't 
steal, don't lie, don't be lazy), often quoted and now enshrined in the 2009 
constitution, either the source or a manifestation of the cultural acceptance of 
lethal punishment for theft? Is there evidence for lynching as punishment in 
rural Bolivia in the distant and recent past and where might information 
about this exist? How do rural Bolivians conceptualise lynching in relation to 
the national justice system? Further exploration of these questions will no 
doubt provide intriguing insight into how we define and describe vigilantism, 
capital punishment and community justice. 
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Notes 
1 In 2012, Ciudadanía conducted personal interviews with 3,029 men and 
women who were over 18 years of age and distributed throughout Bolivia. 
The margin of error at the national level was ±1.78%. 
2 This account was compiled from Aria Gutiérrez 2012, El Diario 2012a, and El 
Diario 2012b. The story is controversial and hotly contested. 
3 There are dinosaur footprints and ancient rock art nearby and the centuries-
old village church is considered fine, but all ventures to bring tourists to the 
village have failed. 
4 bruja is not necessarily an entirely negative term. 
                                                 
